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Judicial Estoppel and the
Eleventh Circuit Consumer
Bankruptcy Debtor
by Hon. James D. Walker, Jr.*
and Amber Nickell"*
Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine intended to prevent a litigant
from making a mockery of the judicial system by asserting inconsistent
positions in different legal proceedings.' The peculiarities of bankruptcy, however, are not always conducive to the easy application of judicial
estoppel, particularly when it harms the debtor's creditors. Since the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided its first bankruptcy-related
judicial estoppel case in 2002,2 the court has not fully addressed some
important complexities raised by bankruptcy.
Part I of this Article explains how relevant bankruptcy law can
complicate the application of judicial estoppel. Parts II and III examine
the body of law regarding judicial estoppel raised as a defense that is
presently emerging from federal and state courts within the Eleventh
Circuit. Part IV looks at the impact ofjudicial estoppel in the bankruptcy courts. Part V suggests a new focus for judicial estoppel analysis
when the plaintiff is a bankruptcy debtor.
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1. Hon. William Houston Brown et al., Debtors' Counsel Beware: Use of the Doctrine
of Judicial Estoppel in Nonbankruptcy Forums, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197, 200-02 (2001).
2. Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002).
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THE PECULIARITIES OF BANKRUPTCY LAW

When a debtor files for bankruptcy, he is required to list all assets on
his bankruptcy schedules.3 All his nonexempt assets, including causes
of action, become property of the bankruptcy estate.4 So long as causes
of action remain property of the estate, only the trustee may pursue
them.' Property of the estate will revest in the debtor if it is abandoned
by the trustee. 6 In Chapter 13,7 post-petition property necessary to the
8
completion of the plan becomes property of the estate. In addition, in
Chapter 13, unless the plan provides otherwise, property of the estate
that is not necessary to the completion of the plan revests in the debtor
upon plan confirmation.' Property that has not been administered or
revested in the debtor, including causes of action not listed on the
schedules, remains property of the estate even after the case has been
closed."°
11
If
While a case is open, the debtor can freely amend his schedules.
the case has closed, the debtor or the trustee must ask the bankruptcy
court to reopen the case in order to amend the schedules to add a cause
of action. 2 A court may reopen a bankruptcy case "to administer
3
The decision
assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause."
4
When deciding
to reopen a case is within the court's discretion.
whether to reopen a case for the purpose of allowing debtors to add a

cause of action, most courts refuse to consider the debtor's motive for
omitting the asset.' 5 Instead, courts focus on three considerations: "1)

3. 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (2000); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b)(1).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 323 (2000); Parker v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir.
2004).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (2000).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (2000); Telfair v. First Union Mortgage Corp., 216 F.3d 1333,
1340 (l1th Cir. 2000).
9. Telfair, 216 F.3d at 1340. In the Northern District of Georgia, for example, the
locally approved plan provides for no revesting until discharge or dismissal.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2000).
11. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1009(a).
12. See id.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) (2000).
14. In re Lewis, 273 B.R. 739, 743 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2001).
15. See, e.g., In re Upshur, 317 B.R. 446, 454 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2004); In re Tarrer, 273
B.R. 724, 734 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002); In re Strickland, 285 B.R. 537, 539 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
2001). Nevertheless, the court in In re Rochester understood the Eleventh Circuit cases to
.suggest that a bankruptcy court, in order to achieve the policy goal of encouraging full
disclosure in the bankruptcy process, should not reopen a bankruptcy case for the purpose

JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL

20051

1117

the benefit to the debtor; 2) the prejudice or detriment to the defendant
in the pending litigation; and 3) the benefit to the debtor's creditors."16
II.
A.

JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

New Hampshire v. Maine

In New Hampshire v. Maine, 7 a nonbankruptcy case, the United
States Supreme Court described judicial estoppel as an equitable
doctrine to be applied at a court's discretion "'to protect the integrity of
the judicial process.""' 8 Judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the
judicial process by preventing a party from pursuing contradictory
positions in different proceedings. 9 Although the doctrine does not
lend itself to a hard and fast rule, the Court set forth three factors
relevant to judicial estoppel inquiries:
(1) a party's later position must be "clearly inconsistent" with its earlier
position [; (2) the party] succeeded in persuading a court to accept that
party's earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent
position in a later proceeding would create "the perception that either
the first or the second court was misled" [; and (3)] the party seeking
to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or
impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.20
The Court noted that other factors also may be relevant depending on
the circumstances.21

B.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

1. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals Decisions Regarding
Judicial Estoppel. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has decided
four bankruptcy-related judicial estoppel cases.22 Each case reached
the court on appeal from the application of judicial estoppel in a

of administering an undisclosed cause of action if it is clear that the debtor intentionally
failed to disclose the asset." 308 B.R. 596, 604 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2004) (emphasis added).
16. Tarrer,273 B.R. at 732.
17. 532 U.S. 742 (2001).
18. Id. at 749 (quoting Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir.
1982)).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 750-51 (quoting Edwards, 690 F.2d at 599).
21. Id. at 751.
22. After this Article was written, the court decided a fifth case, Muse v. Accord Human
Resources, Inc., No. 04-16491, 2005 WL 891015 (11th Cir. Apr. 15, 2005). Muse does not
change the analytical framework discussed in this Article. See infra note 106.
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nonbankruptcy proceeding. Before turning to the rationale in these
cases, a brief review of their facts is instructive.
In the first case, Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc.,23 the debtor filed a
Chapter 13 petition and listed no causes of action in his schedules. Six
months later, he initiated an employment discrimination claim but did
not amend his schedules. Thereafter, the debtor converted his case to
Chapter 724 and, again, failed to amend his schedules. The debtor
received a discharge, and the employment discrimination defendant was
granted summary judgment on the ground of judicial estoppel. 2' The
circuit court affirmed the application of judicial estoppel to debtor's
request for monetary relief but reversed 26the application of judicial
estoppel to the request for injunctive relief.
In the second case, De Leon v. Comcar Industries,7 the debtor, prior
to filing a Chapter 13 petition, initiated employment discrimination
proceedings by seeking a right-to-sue letter. He received the right-to-sue
letter post-petition but prior to confirmation. The plan was confirmed,
but it is unclear what happened next.2 8 According to the circuit court,
the debtor "filed an amended petition to reopen the bankruptcy
estate."2' Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court docket indicated that the
debtor filed an amended schedule B on April 9, 2002.30 In any event,
the employment discrimination defendant sought and received summary
judgment in the district court based on judicial estoppel." The circuit
court affirmed. 32
3
In the third case, Barger v. Cartersville,"
the debtor initiated an
employment discrimination action, seeking monetary and injunctive
relief, prior to filing a Chapter 7 petition. The discrimination claim was
not listed on her schedules. The debtor, however, told her bankruptcy
attorney about the action and told the bankruptcy trustee about her
claim for an injunction. The debtor did not mention her bankruptcy case
despite the fact that she was asked about other legal proceedings during
the discovery phase of the employment discrimination suit. The debtor
received a discharge, and her bankruptcy case was closed. After

23. 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 701 (2000).
25. Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1284.
26. Id. at 1289.
27.
28.

321 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1290-91.

29. Id. at 1291.
30.

Docket Report, No. 8:00-bk-17273-PMG (Bankr. M.D. Fla.).

31.
32.
33.

De Leon, 321 F.3d at 1290, 1292.
Id. at 1292.
348 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003).

20051

JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL

1119

learning of the bankruptcy, defendants in the discrimination suit sought
summary judgment. The debtor was granted permission to reopen her
bankruptcy case in order to add her discrimination claim. The district
court granted summary judgment to defendant on the ground of judicial
estoppel. Shortly thereafter, the debtor obtained a written opinion from
the bankruptcy court stating that the omission of her claim was due to
her attorney's inadvertence. Nevertheless, the district court refused to
reconsider its grant of summary judgment.34 The circuit court affirmed
the application of judicial estoppel to the claim for monetary damages
but reversed on the claim for injunctive relief.35
In the fourth and most recent case, Parker u. Wendy's International,
Inc. ,36 the debtor filed an employment discrimination claim two years
before filing a Chapter 7 petition. She did not list the pending action on
her bankruptcy schedules. The bankruptcy court granted a discharge
and closed the bankruptcy case. The debtor's attorney in the discrimination case later informed the Chapter 7 trustee about the discrimination
claim. The trustee sought to intervene in the employment discrimination case and reopen the bankruptcy case. Both requests were granted.
Subsequently, the district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss
based on judicial estoppel.3" The circuit court reversed.38
Parker is significant for two reasons. First, of the four mentioned
cases, Parker is the only case where the defendant lost on the judicial
estoppel issue with respect to a claim for monetary relief. Additionally,
it is the only case where some action was taken to amend the bankruptcy schedules before an assertion of judicial estoppel.
2. The Eleventh Circuit Test for Judicial Estoppel Cases. The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a test for analyzing judicial
estoppel cases that uses punishment of the nondisclosing debtor as the
mechanism for protecting the integrity of the judicial system. The court
has consistently applied a two-prong test in all bankruptcy-related
judicial estoppel cases. First, "'the allegedly inconsistent positions [must
have been] made under oath in a prior proceeding."' 39 Second, the
"'inconsistencies must .. .have been calculated to make a mockery of
the judicial system."'' 6 The court decided that this test was consistent

34. Id. at 1291-92.
35. Id. at 1297.
36. 365 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2004).
37. Id. at 1269-71.
38. Id. at 1273.
39. Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1285 (quoting Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. v. Harvey, 260 F.3d
1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2001)).
40. Id.
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with the factors set forth by the Supreme Court in New Hampshire and
"provide[s] courts with sufficient flexibility in determining the applicability of the doctrine of judicial estoppel based on the facts of a particular
case."" Because the purpose of judicial estoppel is to "protect[] the
integrity of the judicial system" rather than the parties, neither privity
nor detrimental reliance is a component of the analysis.42
a. Prong One-The Debtor made the inconsistent statement under
oath. Prong one, requiring that the statements be made under oath,
has been the subject of virtually no discussion by the circuit court.
Instead, by signing his bankruptcy petition, the debtor is presumed to
have asserted an inconsistent position under oath.4 In Walker v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc. ," the district court concluded that the Eleventh Circuit
test requires no inquiry into whether the bankruptcy court adopted the
debtor's position. 4 Nevertheless, when the trustee is the real party in
interest, the signed petition is not charged against the trustee, at least
so long as the recovery does not exceed the amount of the claims in the
bankruptcy case, plus fees and costs.4
The issue of the real party in interest, when the debtor is a Chapter
7 debtor, has created some tension among Eleventh Circuit panels. In
Burnes the debtor pursued the discrimination claim, and the issue of
whether he was the real party in interest was never raised.4" In
Barger the court noted that the Chapter 7 trustee is the real party in
interest but did not discuss whether that fact affected judicial estoppel
analysis.'
Parkerwas the first case where the court analyzed the impact of the
trustee's role.4 The court concluded that while "the trustee does not

41. Id. at 1285-86.
42. Id. at 1286.
43. Id. ("There is no debate that Billups's financial disclosure forms were submitted
under oath to the bankruptcy court; therefore, the issue becomes one of intent." Id. at
1286.); Barger,348 F.3d at 1294 ("There is no debate that Barger submitted her Statement
of Financial Affairs under oath to the bankruptcy court. Therefore, the issue here is
intent." Id. at 1294.). See also De Leon, 321 F.3d at 1292 (making no mention of prong
one); Parker, 365 F.3d at 1271-73 (stating the trustee conceded that the debtor "took
inconsistent positions in bankruptcy court and district court[,]" but the trustee "made no
false or inconsistent statement under oath in a prior proceeding and is not tainted or
burdened by the debtor's misconduct." Id. at 1271-'73.).
44. No. 100CV0558-TWT, 2002 WL 32136202 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2002).
45. Id. at *5.
46. Parker, 365 F.3d at 1272, 1273 n.4.
47. Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1286.
48. Barger, 348 F.3d at 1292-93.
49. Parker, 365 F.3d at 1269.
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have any more rights than the debtor ...any post-petition conduct by
Parker, including failure to disclose an asset, does not relate to the
merits of the discrimination claim." 50 In reaching its conclusion, the
court stated that "it is questionable as to whether judicial estoppel was
correctly applied in Burnes. The more appropriate defense in Burnes
was, instead, that the debtor lacked standing."5 1 The court made no
mention of whether Barger,in which the trustee was substituted as the
real party in interest and was successfully thwarted by judicial estoppel,
was correctly decided. Notably, no one judge has heard more than one
of the four Eleventh Circuit cases discussed in this Article, and none of
the cases were decided en banc.
b. Prong7vo-The debtor made the statement with the intent to make
a mockery of the judicial system. Prong two of the Eleventh Circuit test
for judicial estoppel in bankruptcy-related cases evaluates the debtor's
intent to make a mockery of the judicial system, which the court defines
as "a purposeful contradiction-not simple error or inadvertence." 2
The requisite intent can be inferred if the debtor (1) knew about the
undisclosed claims and (2) had a motive to conceal them. 3 Because
"the need for complete and honest disclosure exists in all types of
bankruptcies," the court makes no distinction between Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13 cases on the question of intent.54
As with the assertion of an inconsistent position, the debtor's
knowledge of the cause of action is virtually assumed. The court has
found knowledge when the debtor had initiated an undisclosed cause of
action prior to filing for bankruptcy 5 and when the debtor initiated a
cause of action after filing for bankruptcy but did not amend his
schedules.56 Waiting until judicial estoppel is raised in the nonbankruptcy proceeding before attempting to amend schedules is also evidence
of intent. 7 Blaming the omission on an attorney, moreover, will not

50. 365 F.3d at 1272 n.3.
51. Id. at 1272.
52. Barger, 348 F.3d at 1294.
53. Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1287 (citing In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 210 (5th
Cir. 1999)).
54. De Leon, 321 F.3d at 1291.
55. Barger, 348 F.3d at 1294-95.
56. De Leon, 321 F.3d at 1291-92; Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1287-88.
57. Compare Barger, 348 F.3d at 1297; De Leon, 321 F.3d at 1291-92; and Burnes, 291
F.3d at 1288, with Baldwin v. Citigroup, Inc. (In re Baldwin), 307 B.R. 251, 269 (M.D. Ala.
2004) (judicial estoppel did not apply when "the debtor was not aware of his claim [when
he filed his bankruptcy petition) and upon becoming aware, he promptly amended his
schedule." Id. at 269.).
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save a debtor.5" The proper remedy in such circumstances is a malpractice action.5 9 Furthermore, any time a debtor will benefit financially from the nondisclosure, the debtor has a motive to conceal the cause
of action." ° The mere existence of a claim for damages creates motive
because, by omitting the claim, the debtor can keep any proceeds from
the cause of action.6 1
III.
A.

APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL BY THE STATE COURTS

Alabama

In 2003 the Alabama Supreme Court, in Vincent v. First Alabama
Bank,6 2 adopted a new test for judicial estoppel. s3 Prior to Vincent,
the court used a six-part test that required both privity between the
parties and detrimental reliance by the defendant on the previous
inconsistent position. 4 In Vincent the debtor placed large amounts of
cash in a safety deposit box. The bank granted his wife unauthorized
access to the box, and she removed the money. The debtor sued the
bank for negligence. The debtor, however, had not listed the money as
an asset in his bankruptcy case, and the bank asserted judicial estoppel
as a defense to the negligence action. 5
Under the applicable version of judicial estoppel, the bank had to
prove privity and detrimental reliance."6
After noting some "depart[ure] from rigid adherence to the requirements" of privity and
detrimental reliance in its previous cases, the court expressly changed
its position.67 The court believed that such rigid requirements defeated
judicial estoppel's purpose of protecting the court rather than the

58. Barger,348 F.3d at 1295.
59. Id.
60. The Eleventh Circuit has not applied judicial estoppel when the omitted claims
were for nonmonetary relief. Barger, 348 F.3d at 1297; Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1289.
61. Barger, 348 F.3d at 1296; De Leon, 321 F.3d at 1292; Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1288.
62. 883 So. 2d 1236 (Ala. 2003).
63. Id. at 1244-45.
64. Jinright v. Paulk, 758 So. 2d 553, 555 (Ala. 2000) (quoting 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel
and Waiver § 70 (1966)). The six factors are:
(1) The inconsistent position first asserted must have been successfully maintained; (2) a judgment must have been rendered; (3) the positions must be clearly
inconsistent; (4) the parties and questions must be the same; (5) the party
claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed his position; and (6)
it must appear unjust to one party to permit the other to change.
Id.
65. Vincent, 883 So. 2d at 1238-39.
66. Id. at 1242.
67. Id. at 1243.
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litigants. 8 In Vincent the judicial estoppel defense would have been
ineffective if the old rule applied.6 9 The court determined that "such
a result in this case is simply offensive-Vincent would be permitted to
have it both ways, successfully denying ownership of an asset in the
earlier proceedings and seeking its recovery in this proceeding.""
Consequently, the court adopted the test set forth in New Hampshire v.
Maine7 and overruled any prior cases that were inconsistent with the
new 7 3test.72 The Alabama courts have yet to fully develop the new
test.
B.

Florida

Unlike Alabama courts, Florida courts still apply the older version of
judicial estoppel that requires both privity and detrimental reliance.74
Under such strict requirements, judicial estoppel can be hard to prove
in a bankruptcy context, as demonstrated by the Vincent case, and, thus,
less likely to be raised as a defense. This may explain why judicial
estoppel has been raised in only a handful of Florida cases.
As the court in Ramsey v. Jonassen7 5 noted, "[j]udicial estoppel is not
a principle that has been fully developed in Florida law." 6 In Ramsey
a Chapter 11 debtor filed a legal malpractice claim against her attorney.
The attorney successfully raised the defense of judicial estoppel because
the debtor had omitted the claim from her bankruptcy petition.77 The

68. Id. at 1243-44.
69. Id. at 1245.
70. Id.
71. 532 U.S. 742 (2001).
72. Vincent, 883 So. 2d at 1245.
73. Since Vincent, one case, Criderv. Misty Acres, 893 So. 2d 1165 (Ala. Ct. App. 2004),
has invoked judicial estoppel. In Crider the debtors disclosed and claimed an exemption
for their state law cause of action, valuing it at $2,500. Defendants raised judicial estoppel
to try to limit the debtors to a recovery of $2,500. Id. at 1167, 1172. The court rejected
that argument, stating:
There is no evidence indicating that the Criders attempted to mislead the
bankruptcy court when they notified the court of the contingent claim and placed
a value on that claim or that seeking damages over $2,500 would result in a
miscarriage of justice where the bankruptcy trustee knew of the nature of the
lawsuit and the lawsuit was exempted from the bankruptcy estate without
objection from any interested party.
Id. at 1172.
74. Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 790 So. 2d 1061, 1066 (Fla. 2001) (quoting 21 C.J.
1228).
75. 737 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
76. Id. at 1115.
77. Id.
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court of appeals reversed due to lack of reliance.7 8 "Since Appellee...
was not a creditor in the bankruptcy action, and ... did not vote in favor
of the reorganization in reliance on the absence of any possible 'set off,'
he cannot claim to have relied on Appellant's failure to disclose the
malpractice claim in her bankruptcy action."79 Thus, judicial estoppel
was inapplicable. 80
C.

Georgia

The Georgia Supreme Court has "striven to apply the 'federal' doctrine
of judicial estoppel, in an effort 'to afford the judgment of the bankruptcy
court the same effect here as would result in the court where that
judgment was rendered."'' In Wolfork v. Tackett, 2 a case that faced
heavy criticism in bankruptcy circles, 3 the Georgia Supreme Court
applied judicial estoppel to the post-petition tort claim of a Chapter 13
debtor.84 The court stated that the "failure to reveal assets, including
unliquidated tort claims, operates as a denial that such assets exist,
deprives the bankruptcy court of the full information it needs to evaluate
and rule upon a bankruptcy petition, and deprives creditors of resources
that may satisfy unpaid obligations."85
Georgia courts have since retreated, somewhat, from the harsh result
in Wolfork,' 6 focusing much of their analysis on events in the bankruptcy court. For example, in Chicon v. Carter,7 which also involved the
undisclosed post-petition tort claim of the debtors, the court refused to
apply judicial estoppel. 88 In Chicon the debtors completed a Chapter
13 plan that paid one hundred percent of their claims, and the bankruptcy court granted the debtors a discharge. Thereafter, the debtors filed

78. Id. at 1116.
79. Id.
80. Id. See also Vining v. Segal, 773 So. 2d 1243, 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) ("The
failure to disclose an asset in a bankruptcy action does not justify the application ofjudicial
estoppel in a subsequent action absent a showing of detrimental reliance." Id. at 1243.).
81. IBF Participating Income Fund v. Dillard-Winecoff, LLC, 275 Ga. 765, 766, 573
S.E.2d 58, 59 (2002) (quoting Southmark Corp. v. Trotter, Smith & Jacobs, 212 Ga. App.
454, 455, 442 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. App. 1994)).
82. 273 Ga. 328, 540 S.E.2d 611 (2001).
83. Brown, supra note 1, at 206.
84. Wolfork, 273 Ga. at 328, 540 S.E.2d at 612.
85. Id.
86. In Period Homes, Ltd. v. Wallick, 275 Ga. 486, 569 S.E.2d 502 (2002), the court
expressly repudiated Wolfork to the extent that a Chapter 7 or 11 debtor is required to
amend its bankruptcy petition to add assets acquired post-petition. Id. at 487-88, 569
S.E.2d at 503-04.
87. 258 Ga. App. 164, 573 S.E.2d 413 (2002).
88. Id. at 164, 573 S.E.2d at 414.
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a tort claim in state court, and defendant raised judicial estoppel as a
defense. The debtors immediately sought to reopen the bankruptcy case
to amend their schedules. The bankruptcy court denied the request to
reopen on the ground that the tort cause of action was not property of
the bankruptcy estate, so disclosure was not necessary. Consequently,
the bankruptcy court stated that judicial estoppel should not apply to
bar the tort claim.8 9 Deferring to the judgment of the bankruptcy
court, the Georgia Court of Appeals stated that "'it stands to reason that
the Georgia court in which the tort claim is asserted should honor the
bankruptcy court's actions. To hold otherwise would produce overly
harsh and inequitable results.' 9
In other cases where the debtor has shown that amendment of his
schedules was not necessary or when the debtor successfully amended
his schedules to add the omitted causes of action, the courts have
declined to apply judicial estoppel.9 Similarly, the courts have held
judicial estoppel inapplicable when the debtors have "effectively
eliminated any inconsistency" that arose from their omission of a cause
of action from their bankruptcy petition by voluntarily dismissing the
bankruptcy case. 92
IV.

BANKRUPTCY COURT CASES

In Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc.," the debtor argued that he should
be allowed to reopen his bankruptcy case and add the omitted claim to
his schedules.94 The circuit court responded, saying,

89. Id. at 164-65, 573 S.E.2d at 414.
90. Id. at 166,573 S.E.2d at 415 (quoting Jowers v. Arthur, 245 Ga. App. 68, 70-71,537
S.E.2d 200 (2000)).
91. Compare Period Homes, Ltd. v. Wallick, 275 Ga. App. 486, 488-89, 569 S.E.2d 502,
504 (2002) (holding that the debtor had neither misled the bankruptcy court nor gained any
benefit from the omission); and Rowan v. George H. Green Oil, Inc., 257 Ga. App. 774, 77576, 572 S.E.2d 338, 339-40 (2002) (declining to apply judicial estoppel when debtor
amended her bankruptcy schedules after defendant raised judicial estoppel), with Cochran
v. Emory Univ., 251 Ga. App. 737, 739, 555 S.E.2d 96, 99 (2001) (allowing discretion in
applying judicial estoppel when debtor waited until after summary judgment had been
granted to amend her schedules).
92. Weiser v. Wert, 251 Ga. App. 566, 568, 554 S.E.2d 762, 764-65 (2001); see also IBF
ParticipatingIncome Fund, 275 Ga. at 767, 573 S.E.2d at 60 (refusing to apply judicial
estoppel when a Chapter 11 case was dismissed for cause because the dismissal "returnfed]
the debtor and creditors to the status quo ante," thus eliminating any benefit to the debtor
arising from the omission).
93. 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002).
94. Id. at 1288.
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The success of our bankruptcy laws requires a debtor's full and honest
disclosure. Allowing [the debtor] to back-up, re-open [sic] the bankruptcy case, and amend his bankruptcy filings, only after his omission
has been challenged by an adversary, suggests that a debtor should
consider disclosing potential assets only if he is caught concealing
them. This so-called remedy" would only diminish the necessary
incentive to provide the bankruptcy court with a truthful disclosure of
debtors' assets. 95
The circuit court openly disapproves of debtors amending their
schedules only after judicial estoppel has been raised as a defense in the
nonbankruptcy case. Even a bankruptcy court ruling that the omission
was inadvertent does not help the debtor.96 This approach is markedly
different from the Georgia approach, which allows amendment of
bankruptcy schedules to defeat a judicial estoppel defense, even if the
amendment occurs after the defense is raised, so long as the debtor does
not dawdle in seeking amendment.97 Based on these decisions, many
debtors (or trustees) attempt to influence the judicial estoppel decision
in nonbankruptcy court proceedings by amending the bankruptcy
schedules to add the previously omitted cause of action. In some
instances, the bankruptcy court must reopen the case. Even though the
issue ofjudicial estoppel is not formally before the bankruptcy court, the
court's ruling could be determinative in the nonbankruptcy court.
Bankruptcy courts are well aware of the possible repercussions of their
decisions.
In some cases, that knowledge may play a role in the
bankruptcy court's decision. Some courts have gone as far as to prejudge the judicial estoppel issue.9" Others refuse to consider its impact
at all. 99
Of course, Parker v. Wendy's International, Inc.1 °° changed the
landscape for Chapter 7 cases. Now, the trustee will be able to pursue
the nonbankruptcy claim free from judicial estoppel concerns, at least in
the federal courts. Yet, even Parker has caused some disagreement
among the bankruptcy courts. Courts are divided concerning whether
a bankruptcy court can and should define the scope of a judicial estoppel
defense by limiting the amount of damages the trustee can recover,

95. Id.
96. Barger v. Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003).
97. See supra Part III.C.
98. In re Rochester, 308 B.R. 596, 605 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2004); In re Huggins, 305 B.R.
63, 66 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2003).
99. In re Upshur, 317 B.R. 446, 454 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2004).
100. 365 F.3d at 1268 (11th Cir. 2004).
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which prevents the debtor from receiving a windfall if the damages
exceed the value of the claims in the bankruptcy case.''
While Chapter 7 inquiries may have been simplified by Parker, the
bankruptcy courts must still address motions by Chapter 13 debtors to
amend schedules. Chapter 13 cases are not closed until the plan is
completed and the discharge is entered.0 2 Thus, the debtor can add
°3
an omitted claim without first petitioning the bankruptcy court.
Furthermore, causes of action that arise post-confirmation are not
always property of the estate pursuant to Telfair v. First Union
Mortgage Corp."°4 and, thus, need not be listed at all.0 5 When the
courts make
cause of action is not property of the estate, the bankruptcy
10 6
a point of stating that judicial estoppel should not apply.
V.

A NEW APPROACH

Judicial estoppel, in the context of bankruptcy law, can have a
significant impact on parties other than the debtor and the defendant.
If judicial estoppel is successfully invoked, the defendant will benefit by
escaping accountability for his negligent or bad acts to the detriment of
innocent third parties, including the debtor's creditors and the debtor's
family.
Perhaps the easiest way to address this problem is by requiring a
more searching inquiry. Instead of treating the filing of the petition as
a previous inconsistent statement, courts should focus on whether the
party "succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party's earlier
position ....,,107In other words, did the bankruptcy court issue any
orders, or did the trustee act in reliance on the omitted cause of action?

0

101. Upshur, 317 B.R. at 453-54 (acknowledging the possibility of a limitation but
leaving such a determination to the district court); In re Williams, 310 B.R. 442, 444
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2004) (limiting the trustee's recovery to the value of unsecured claims,
fees, and expenses).
102. See 11 U.S.C. § 350(a) (2000); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1009(a).
103. Id.
104. 216 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2000).
105. In re Carter, 258 B.R. 526, 527-28 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2001); In re Ross, 278 B.R.
269, 275 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2001).
106. Carter, 258 B.R. at 528; Ross, 278 B.R. at 275. This principle was recently
reaffirmed by the circuit court in Muse v. Accord Human Resources, Inc., No. 04-16491,
2005 WL 891015 (11th Cir. Apr. 15, 2006). The court in Muse held that judicial estoppel
did not apply to a Chapter 13 debtor's claim for overtime wages because it arose postconfirmation and was not necessary to completion of the plan. Id. at *2. Muse does not
otherwise affect the circuit court's judicial estoppel analysis.
107. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750-51.
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Additionally, by inferring bad intent by any debtor who had knowledge
of his claim and who stood to benefit financially by omitting it, the
Eleventh Circuit discourages an inquiry into the debtor's actual motives.
It is unclear under the Eleventh Circuit standard when, if ever, the
omission can be deemed inadvertent.
Yet, in bankruptcy-related cases, a meaningful inquiry is particularly
important. As the court in In re Lewis"°8 explained: "The remedy for
failing to disclose a pre-petition asset should not be one which punishes
creditors; to this Court, such a result is absurd and undermines the
purpose of the bankruptcy system." °9 In effect, the application of
judicial estoppel to a bankruptcy debtor can cause the very result the
doctrine is intended to prevent-it impairs the integrity of the judicial
system.
Some allowance for the fact that, unlike other types of courts, a
bankruptcy court is in the position to protect its own integrity when a
debtor has omitted a cause of action also would be desireable in the
judicial estoppel analysis. Thus, a bankruptcy court does not need to
rely on a second court to do so through the application of judicial
estoppel. "Bankruptcy courts... are empowered to do something about
a debtor's failure to list assets. Bankruptcy courts may deny a Chapter
7 or 11 debtor's discharge for concealing property or making a false oath
or account and may revoke a debtor's discharge that was obtained
through fraud." °
For this reason, no judicial estoppel is necessary in the limited
circumstances when a debtor seeks to assert a cause of action he omitted
from his bankruptcy schedules. Whether or not it intended to do so, the
circuit court effectively implemented such a rule in Parker when it
decided that judicial estoppel does not apply to a bankruptcy trustee."'
The most significant impact of Parker is that it eviscerates prong twq
of the Eleventh Circuit analysis by eliminating the motive-financial
benefit-to conceal a cause of action. When the trustee is pursuing the
claim, any financial gain realized will accrue to the benefit of the
debtor's creditors; not to the benefit of the debtor." 2 The court

108. 273 B.R. 739 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2001).
109. Id. at 748.
110. Robert B. Chapman, Bankruptcy, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1199, 1211 (2002). The
bankruptcy court's ability to revoke a discharge is subject to a statute of limitations. 11
U.S.C. § 727(d)-(e) (2000).
111. Parker, 365 F.3d at 1273.
112. If the trustee abandons the claim and the debtor pursues it in his own name, he
will still be subject to the defense of judicial estoppel.
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virtually ensured this result by suggesting a limited application of
judicial estoppel to prevent the debtor from receiving any amounts
awarded in excess of the bankruptcy claims.1 '
It now remains to be seen how the law on this issue will develop and
whether the state courts will follow the lead of the Eleventh Circuit. In
particular, it will be interesting to see whether the Eleventh Circuit will
attempt to resolve the conflict between Parker and earlier cases like
14
and Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc."5
Barger v. Cartersville

113.
114.
115.

Parker, 365 F.3d at 1273.
348 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003).
291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002).

